A $17 billion settlement between Meta and 48 U.S. states has renewed concerns over whether comparable legal actions could emerge in the UK. The U.S. lawsuit accused Meta’s platforms of being deliberately engineered to addict teenagers, damaging their mental health and breaching data protection rules. As the UK implements what it describes as the “world’s strongest” online child safety regulations globally, platforms like Meta now face scrutiny over whether they can comply with these domestic legal standards.
The U.S. resolution relied on an opt-out class action model, where participation does not require individual sign-ups. The UK’s system may lack an equivalent process for non-compensation disputes. Instead, collective claims operate through Group Litigation Orders (GLOs), which demand active participation and verify each case individually. For mental health claims, this would necessitate expert evaluations for every potential plaintiff-a process likely to stall proceedings before they advance.
GLOs are designed for claims with a unified cause, such as pollution from a single industrial site. Cases are therefore whittled down to those with the clearest common thread, where certification as a group claim is most likely. Mental health harm from social media use presents a far more complex scenario. A claimant might interact with multiple platforms, complicating efforts to attribute responsibility solely to Meta. Courts have already dismissed GLO applications when claims required extensive personal assessments, as demonstrated in Abernethy & Ors v Barclays Bank UK PLC. A social media case would probably encounter the same legal roadblock, allowing defendants like Meta to contest certification on those terms.
The Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) provides an alternative avenue, but with significant restrictions. CAT proceedings default to opt-out participation, eliminating the logistical challenges of GLOs. However, these tribunals only apply to claims involving measurable financial losses-mental health damage does not meet that criterion. Without a mechanism to pursue non-financial harm collectively, the UK’s legal framework may make it difficult to bring the kind of large-scale litigation observed in the U.S.
The U.S. settlement highlights the financial consequences of regulatory oversight failures, and the UK’s legal environment may make a comparable outcome unlikely. The opt-in requirements of GLOs, the necessity for expert verification, and the absence of opt-out options for non-financial claims create substantial obstacles. While the UK strengthens child safety laws, the enforcement tools against major tech firms remain inconsistent.
